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1 Introduction
The topic of parallel imports (PI) has been gaining great attention in recent in-
ternational trade literature. PI is generally dened as unauthorized re-imports of
genuinely produced commodities back to the original producers country. It has
mostly been linked with the issue of price discrimination. This arises when a pro-
ducer sells its product in a second country for a lower price, which is then imported
back to the original country. This creates competition with the original producer,
who is then forced to lower its home price and loses prots. PI has also been linked
with intellectual property rights (IPR), though less frequently, which involves ex-
porting to a country that does not respect the protection of IPRs. Goods meant for
a secondary market are then reproduced by a manufacturer established in a foreign
market or through distributors, and part of the output could be sent back to the
original market. This also increases competition in the home market, thus damag-
ing the local patent holder. As this has been rather neglected in PI literature, we
focus on this second concept of parallel trade, also known as the "gray market".1
In particular, we aim to explain recent specic facts with regards to the so called
catching up of "Southern" countries through technological advancement in a the
context of PI and IPRs.2 Contrary to conventional studies, we look at a South-South
framework, where a home market such as India lacks strong customs at the border,
and the foreign market such as Tanzania is unregulated in terms of IPRs.3
The importance of the link between PI and IPR protection in international trade
has indeed re-emerged since the TRIPS agreement of the 1994. TRIPS gives the sov-
ereignty to each individual member country of the WTO to choose whether or not to
allow PI into their local market. EU for instance has chosen community exhaustion
for all kinds of IPRs, while it does not allow PI from outside the community. US
has also adopted a national exhaustion regime, which again does not allow PI into
the US. The decision of a government whether to allow international exhaustion has
gained particular importance in the past few years. This is partly due to emerging
countries such as India growing to become key players in the global economy. After
the Patent Act 2005, India was obliged to respect IPRs. The main concern for India
has been the pharmaceutical industry, which has been a point of strength for the
1One exception is a recent work by Matsushima and Matsumura (2008); they nd that permitting
PI from an imitator in a country that lacks IPR protection can be benecial to all parties by serving
as a commitment device to soften price competition.
2See Kremer (2002) for a thorough review on the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries.
3See below for more detailed explanation of the specic case of the pharmaceutical industry in
India and Tanzania based on Chaudhuri (2008).
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country since decades. While generics have been freely and skillfully produced in
India, the Patent Act was to put an end to the production of generic drugs whose
patents have not expired.4 On the positive side, this can be seen as a move towards
taking a leading role as innovator of original medicine. The fear on the other hand
has been a sudden surge in prices of pharmaceuticals in India and hence limited
access to necessary medication by a great portion of the population.
One possibility to go around this is thought to be the use of an international ex-
haustion PI regime to allow imports from a country, which still lacks IPR protection,
in order to maintain access to a¤ordable medicine. This has raised debates in the
rapidly evolving Indian pharmaceutical industry, which is in transition from being
an imitative to an innovative industry. Could allowing PI reduce R&D incentives by
inventors in India, hence impeding the road it has taken towards the development of
its own innovative pharmaceutical industry? Moreover, could consumer gains from
PI outweigh its negative impact on prots when variations in R&D investment by
rms in di¤erent industry categories are taken into account?
In our contribution, we separate the market in India by distinguishing between
large scale companies, who are the key innovators, and medium rms, known to be
specialized operators. They are both owners of patents and di¤er with respect to
their e¢ ciency in cost-reducing R&D, which in turn determines their position in the
market. The medium is endowed with an inferior technology. It is therefore moti-
vated to look for new unexploited markets to compensate for its missing competitive
advantage.5 Such markets are often unregulated with respect to IPRs. Therefore,
local manufacturers could reproduce and sell the same good both locally, and also
in the market of origin when PI is present. We seek to single out the direct and
the indirect e¤ects of PI that may occur as a result of this action on innovation
performed by both types of rms.
Our modelling and assumptions are based on recent tendencies in South-South
trade such as the case of the pharmaceutical industry in India and Tanzania. Large
scale Indian rms such as Ranbaxy, Dr. Ready, or Cipla pursue a catch up strategy
by engaging in innovation in order to challenge leading rms in developed countries.6
These rms tend to establish in regulated markets, while smaller Indian rms such
as Lincoln, Simrone, and Aurochem resort to new unexploited markets such as
4All patents registered before 1995 cannot be protected in India despite being protected else-
where. Therefore, they could still be produced as generics in India.
5 In contrast, large scale rms do not have an interest in serving this second market as they tend
to stay in less risky markets where IPR regulations are respected such as US or the EU.
6See Chaudhuri (2005a).
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Tanzania, where India holds the highest number of registered patents.7 Tanzania is
also a good example of an unregulated market, as under the TRIPS agreement they
are not required to introduce IPR protection in pharmaceuticals until 2016.8 Finally,
it is the only new frontier in Africa since 2002 with capabilities to replicate active
principle ingredients (API) besides Egypt, which has been active since 1992. There
are 32 other African countries, which are only capable of producing formulations.
As formulation manufacturing already exists in Tanzania, workers in the Indian
subsidiary may defect and disseminate information to local manufactueres. They
can then use their absorptive capacity to produce the similar nal good that contains
the patented API and sent it back to India.
We build a two-stage game in a two-country model for each scenario (with or
without PI) where the rms located in the home market decide rst the investment
level in cost-reducing innovation and then they compete à la Cournot in the market.
By comparing the optimal investment levels, we show that PI does not necessarily
reduce innovation. In particular, we demonstrate that the equilibrium investment
level in cost-reducing R&D by each type of rm crucially depends on the combina-
tion between rm heterogeneity and the tari¤ rate. Strategic interaction creates a
taxonomy of situations in which innovation by one or both rms can indeed increase
through PI. We nd that for su¢ ciently high tari¤ levels and small technological
superiority by the large scale rm, PI increases R&D e¤orts by both rms. Alter-
natively, when both the tari¤s and the degree of heterogeneity are su¢ ciently high,
the presence of PI enhances R&D carried out by the large scale rm, while reducing
that by the medium rm. For a higher degree of homogeneity across rms and low
tari¤ levels the opposite holds. It follows that high tari¤s are a more important
factor for the decision of the large scale rm to increase R&D, while technological
similarity is so for the medium rm. We further nd that PI can only be socially
optimal when it improves R&D by both rms. Trade policy in this case can be used
as a complementary tool along with PI to benet the society at large. Tari¤s must
be at a high enough level to make PI the favorable policy as the socially optimal
outcome.
Related literature
7 India accounts for 1315 drug products registered in Tanzania in 2007, which is more than one
third of the and by large higher than the following countries (Kenya is ranked second with 307
drugs registered). See Chaudhuri (2008) for more details.
8Even in industries where IPR protection has become mandatory, violations in Tanzania are
not seriously investigated as courts lack experience and training in IPR issues (Index of Economic
Freedom, 2008).
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Li and Maskus (2006), Li (2005) and Li and Robles (2007) are among recent
theoretical papers that deal with the debate over PI and innovation. Li and Maskus
(2006) nds that PI reduces the producers incentives to do cost-reducing innovation.
Li (2005) and Li and Robles (2007) on the other hand show that PI may or may not
discourage product innovation. All three works are however single-producer models,
ruling out competition among rms. Li (2006) integrates competition into the PI
model of Li and Maskus (2006) to explore how competition and PI a¤ect producers
incentives to innovate. They nd that PI may stimulate manufacturers to invest in
cost-reducing innovations. What they do not take into account is the interaction
of the IPR regime of the foreign country and rm heterogeneity with respect to
technological e¢ ciency in the impact of PI on innovation. Instead, as in Maskus
and Li (2006), they focus on the e¤ect of PI for di¤erent levels of of trade costs.
The interaction of tari¤ policy and parallel imports has also taken its own direc-
tion as a branch of literature. Knox and Richardson (2002) show how the optimal
tari¤ decreases when parallel imports are permitted as a monopolist can bneet from
PI. They further show that PI is always optimal whether or not a country sets an
optimal tari¤ rate. Hur and Riyanto (2006) also study the interaction between trade
and PI policy to show that again PI is benecial for the host country in the presence
of a tari¤ policy, which can be set optimally to induce the foreign manufactuere to
impose a price discrimination policy. Their analysis is limited to one monopoly rm
in the original country and innovation has not been considered in their models.
Our model adopts the Leahy and Neary (1997) framework, where rms rst
engage in R&D and then compete in output. Unlike the above strands of literature
however, our paper does not take into account vertical pricing because our main
focus is more on the heteregoeneity of rms and their interests, and the interaction
between the PI and the lack of an IPR regime in a secondary market. In doing so,
we use a modied version of the strategic IPR models of Chen and Grossman (1991),
Zigic (1998), and Naghavi (2007). Using such framework, we reproduce the scenario
for the pharmaceutical industry in India, where a medium rm moves into a new
unregulated market, hence making possible the PI of its goods. Also note that IPRs
are fully protected in the home country, i.e. India after the Patent Act 2005, giving
rms full rights to their technology in the home country. The same argument can be
applied to countries such as the EU and the US to assess the costs and benets of an
international exhaustion system, and for others who have switched to a PI regime
such as Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore, who relaxed their restriction on PI
in late 1990s.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basics of the model
and introduces the case with no PI (duopoly). PI and the trade policy is then
discussed in section 3 and two scenarios are studied: we distinguish beween e¤ects
of PI on cost-reducing innovation by the large scale innovator rm and that by the
medium rm. Section 4 studies welfare and section 5 concludes.
2 The Basic Framework
Consider two Southern countries, labeled as H and F for home and foreign. In the
home market there are two heteregeneous rms, M and L, both of which are owners
of patents. In our example of the Indian pharmaceutical industry, L represents a
large-scale company while M represents a medium rm, which obtains its patent
through the so called "me-too" drugs, i.e. drugs that imitate existing products and
consist of only minor modications.9 We abstract from product di¤erentiation and
assume full homogeneity between the two goods in the eyes of consumers.10 This
is done so without the loss of generality as the results remain the same even when
products are not fully homogeneous.
Both rms can invest in cost-reducing R&D activity but they di¤er in their
ability to perform R&D, with L endowed with a superior e¢ ciency. We assume that
L has an edge on the process innovation activity due to prior investments in the eld
or better team organization. Based on the case study reported in the introduction,
rm M decides therefore to export to an unregulated foreign market with no IPR
protection (Tanzania, for example).11 Firm L, on the contrary, continues to serve
only the home market. The newly available foreign market represents an opportunity
in terms of salesexpansion. Nonetheless, as IPR protection is not guaranteed, local
manufacturers could freely reproduce and sell the drug not only in the F market, but
also reintroduce it in the H market of origin, thus giving rise to PI. We consider only
one rm in the foreign market and assume that its technological endowment does
not su¢ ce to engage in R&D.12 The home government has the possibility to ban PI
9This is for instance incremental innovation to the product, which has already been invented by
the big rm. Thus, no initial large xed cost are involved.
10An example is incremantal innovation on Viagra to make it last 36 hours, which can also be
patented. This competes with the initial version of Viagra and is viewed by consumers just as
important as the original.
11 In the example of Viagra, when the original rm has an advantage, the second rm has an
incentive to go to a new market and exploit its incremental patent.
12This reects the fact that foreign goods in less developed countries comprise a large fraction of
sales compared to local production (see Chaudhuri, 2008 for evidence in Tanzania). In our model,
6
if it considers that social welfare is damaged by such a practice. Alternatively, it
can allow PI while imposing a tari¤ duty on all imports from the foreign country.
We adopt the well known linear demand function for both the H and the F
market:
pi = a Qi i = H;F: (1)
For the sake of simplicity, markets are equal in size, captured by a. In the H market,
depending on whether PI is allowed or not, either two or three rms operate, while
in the F market there are always two rms. More precisely,
QH 
(
QNPH = qL + qMH
QPIH = qL + qMH + qFH
; (2)
QF = qMF + qFF : (3)
Following our previous labeling, subscripts L and M indicate respectively the large
scale rm and the medium rm, both based in H, while subscript F stands for the
foreign rm. Superscripts PI and NP obviously specify whether parallel import is
allowed or not. As the medium rm serves both markets, qMH is the quantity sold
at H and qMF that sold in F . The foreign rm sells qFF in its market; moreover, if
PI is permitted, it may sell qFH in the H market conditional to the payment of a
tari¤  set by the home government.
Prot functions in the home country are given by:
L = (pH   cL)qL   xL; (4)
M = (pH   cM )qMH + (pF   cM )qMF   xM ; (5)
The prot of the rm based in the foreign country depends on the decision of the





= (pF   cF )qFF
PI
F
= (pF   cF )qFF + (pH   cF   )qFH
(6)
The rm in the foreign market does not invest in R&D, while both rms in
the home market invest in cost-reducing R&D, with the L rm enjoying a superior
technological capabilities. The investment e¤orts are indicated by xL and xM and
their e¤ect on the cost functions is represented as follows:
cL = c  
p
xL (7)
this comes due to the cost advantage of the medium rm with respect to the less e¢ cient local rm.
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cM = c  
p
xM (8)
cF = c (9)
where c is the pre-innovation production cost, assumed to be equal across rms,









to assure non-negative marginal cost after innovation. Parameter  2 [0; 1]
captures the technological di¤erence between the large-scale and the medium rm,
with the former beneting from superior cost-reducing technology than the latter.13
Due to full protection of IPR in the home country, rms can save their technology
from being copied at home.
3 Solving the Model
Firms in the H market are engaged in a two-stage game: in the rst stage they
invest in process innovating R&D and in the second stage they compete in quantity
à la Cournot. We solve the game both rst in the case where PI is forbidden and
then in the case where PI is allowed.
3.1 No Parallel Import
We start by considering the case in which PI is banned. In the home market, the
total quantity is given by QNP = qL + qMH and prot functions are:
L = (a  c  qL   qMH + 
p





xM )qMF  xM : (11)
while the prot function for the foreign rm is
NP
F
= (a  c  qMF   qFF )qFF :
Using backward induction, second stage optimal quantities can be easily computed
and are given by:
qL (xL; xM ) =





qMH (xL; xM ) =









13Alternatively, one can think of (1  ) as the technology gap between the two rms.
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By substituting the above expressions into the original home prot functions, we
obtain rst stage prots as a function of R&D investment levels:
L (xL; xM ) = [qL (xL; xM )]
2   xL; (16)
M (xL; xM ) = [qMH (xL; xM )]
2 + [qMF (xL; xM )]
2   xM ; (17)
Taking First Order Conditions (FOCs) w.r.t xL and xM , optimal R&D investments















2 ] for the
optimal R&D investment levels to be admissable. Comparative statics reveal that
innovation by both rms is always positively related to the overall R&D e¢ ciency of
the industry . Innovation by the L rm is decreasing, while that ofM is increasing
in , i.e. with a lower technological gap. Comparing the R&D levels by the two
rms, there exists a critical level
NP =
52   9 +
p
81 + 182 + 254
122
2 (0; 1) ; (20)
above which xM > x

L. Note that in the absence of an additional market for the
M rm, R&D e¤ort by the L rm would always be higher due to its technological
superiority. The market opportunity for the M rm works as a force against their
technological inferiority to have M engage in more innovation for su¢ ciently high
levels of .










27  442   122

; (23)
14For the sake sake of exposition, we can set (a   c) to unity as it appears in a multiplicative
form in front of optimal R&D investments, quanitites, and prots.
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qFF =
(3  2)(3 + 2)(3  422)

: (24)
The derivatives of the optimal quantities w.r.t.  convey the expected results that
@qL=@ < 0; @q

FF
=@ < 0 and @qMi=@ > 0. When considering the e¤ect of a
change in , we get @qL=@ > 0, @q

MF
=@ > 0 and @qFF =@ < 0; however, the sign
of @qMH=@ depends on . In particular










2 (0; 1). The output by the
M rm is positively related to the overall R&D e¢ ciency in the industry only when
the technological gap between the two rms is small, i.e. when expression (25) holds.
Finally, optimal prots are in turn:
L =




2(729  8102 + 2344 + 1684   22462 + 72042   64822)
2
: (27)
As with the innovation e¤orts, prot of the L rm is decreasing , while that of
the M rm is increasing in . More interestingly, comparative statics with respect
to the overall R&D e¢ ciency  reveal that:
Lemma 1 @L=@ < 0 and @

M=@ > 0 for high values of , while the opposite
holds for low values of .
Proof: see the Appendix :
When rms are relatively homogeneous in terms of technology, an increase in 
boosts investments in cost-reducing R&D and quantities produced by both rms.
Consequently, the price in the domestic market falls reducing rmshome revenues
net of R&D costs. This is driven by over-investment in R&D explaining why the
prot of L shrinks. Since the M rm enjoys revenues from a second market where
there is no R&D competition, the gains coming from such a market overcompensates
the loss in the home market, thus explaining the sign of @M=@ > 0; @

L=@ < 0.
For lower values of , on the other hand, the e¢ ciency gap is enough to give L
an edge to enjoy a greater market share and yield higher prots when the overall





We now assume that PI is allowed into the home country; the foreign rm can enter
the home market, whose total quantity becomes QPI = qL + qMH + qFH . As a
consequence, prot functions are given by:
L = (a  c  qL   qMH   qFH + 
p









= (a  c  qMF   qFF )qFF + (a  c  qL   qMH   qFH   )qFH ; (30)
where  = t(a   c) is the tari¤ rate normalized by the size of the market. Using
backward induction, second stage optimal quantities can be computed and are given
by:
qL (xL; xM ) =





qMH (xL; xM ) =













qFH (xL; xM ) =





By substituting the above expressions into the original home prot functions, we
obtain rst stage prots as a function of R&D investment levels:
L (xL; xM ) = [qL (xL; xM )]
2   xL; (36)
M (xL; xM ) = [qMH (xL; xM )]
2 + [qMF (xL; xM )]
2   xM ; (37)




























153+81 ] for (38) and (39) to be feasible.
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Innovation by both rms is always increasing in the overall technology e¢ ciency
 and in tari¤s  . Similar to the NP case, innovation by the L rm is decreasing,
while that of M is increasing in . We can identify the threshold value
PI =
92 (9 + 17)  108   236 +
p
z
62 (51 + 43)
2 (0; 1) ; (40)
z = 92
h
92 (9 + 17)2 + 42482 + 5616   680
i
+ 16 (27 + 59)2
above which xM > x

L .
Optimal quantities can be calculated and are given by:
qL =
























Comparative statics with respect to  and  replicate the mechanism obtained in
the case with no PI. More precisely, the sign of @qMH=@ also depends on  and
@qMH=@ > 0 i¤  > ̂, where ̂ <
~
holds at all time.15 These results imply that under a PI regime, a lower threshold
 is necessary for the M rm to increase output when overall technology e¢ ciency
improves. In other words, PI tends to be a positive factor for the home market of the
M rm in a country where overall R&D e¢ ciency is growing. Additionally, output
by home rms increases and that by the foreign rm decreases in tari¤s. There is a
level of prohibitive tari¤s that blocks PI by making qFH (xL; xM ) = 0, which is
̂ =
(4  32)(12  1722)
144  722 + 5942   13622
:
Finally, optimal prots are:
L =
(4  3)(4 + 3)













where 	 is to be simplied and dened in the appendix. The comparative statics
of the PI case works in the same direction as the NP case, with the addition that
prots of both rms are increasing in tari¤s  .
4 Analyzing the Model
4.1 The Impact on Innovation
The aim of this section is to compare the innovation e¤ort carried by the rms L
and M in the two regimes, by taking into account the e¤ect of the tari¤ levied by
the home government.
We start by analyzing (20) and (40) and use parameter  as a discriminant. It
is easy to verify that under free trade (i.e. when   ! 0) it always holds that
NP > PI . This indicates that allowing PI would induce M to perform more R&D
than L for a larger range of  than in absence of PI. In other words, absent tari¤s,
PI tends to push the M rm to do R&D relative to the L rm. Yet, there exists a
threshold level of tari¤s
 =
2(2552   686) + 117 + (512   13)
p

2(2652   1602) + 1539 + (532   171)
p

with  = 81+182+254, above which NP < PI . The e¤ect of PI in this situation
is to push the L rm to invest more in R&D than the M rm, i.e. xL > xM for a
larger spectrum of  than without PI. As a result, a policy of PI with a su¢ ciently
high tari¤ rate ( > ) reinforces the position of the L rm as the innovative leader
in the market.
We can now evaluate the R&D e¤ort exerted by rms across the two regimes.
This reveals whether PI can bring out a stimulus to invest in cost-reducing activities.
Comparing the optimal R&D investment by each rm, there exists a critical value
of  above which PI increases R&D: xL > x





M if  > M ,
where
L =

















(72   18)2   9
	 : (49)
When comparing L and M , we nd that they only cross once in  2 (0; 1) and






Lemma 2 xL > x





M when  > M , with M and L
crossing only once in 0 <  < 1.
In Figure 1 we represent M and L as a function of .16 We nd four parameter
regions, labelled A, B, C and D; in each of them we can easy compare the R&D
















Recall, introducing PI reduces the market share of L andM in the home market.
A lower market share would imply less incentives to invest in cost-reducing R&D.
While the L rm only serves the home market, M also competes in the foreign
country with a local rm, which has no R&D capabilities. It follows that theM rm
balances out gains and losses in the two markets when deciding its R&D expenditure.
Let us now examine the four di¤erent regions in the gure:
In region A, we observe a combination of low values of  and  . PI decreases
R&D by both rms due to the competition added from the imports of the foreign
rm. In this zone, the foreign rm is very competitive in H because of the absence
16Figure 1 has been plotted by xing  = 0:7.
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of protection through tari¤s, and because of the lack of a technological advantage by
M over the entrant that could hamper progress by the latter into the home market.
In region B, where  is su¢ ciently high, but  takes on a low value, PI increases
R&D e¤orts by the L rm while reducing that by M . As the L rm has a dominant
position in the market with respect to M , the foreign entrant steals market share
from the more vulnerable M rm. The L rm hence turns more aggressive and
increases innovation when protected by su¢ cienty high tari¤s.
Region C illustrates a combination of high values of  and  , where PI increases
R&D by both rms. In this situation both rms gain from large tari¤ levels and the
M rm enjoys a large advantage in both markets.
Finally, region D depicts low values of  with high values of . The L rm
here reduces its R&D e¤orts when PI is introduced, while M increases his. The M
rm is approximately as e¢ cient as L at home, while enjoying a large technological
advantage in the foreign market. Having an extra market increases R&D by M ,
which in turn also gives it an edge in the home market. As it can be seen in the
gure, the rise in R&D by M creates the need for a a higher  for L to increase its
e¤orts.
Some illustrative examples of movements from one zone to another will clarify
the role played by our relevant parameters on innovation. First, we start from
point E1 belonging to region A. A righward move towards region D driven by an
increase in , makes rm M more e¢ cient in cost-reducing R&D. The advantage
over the foreign rm in its second market outweighs the R&D disincentives in the
home market created by the presence of a though third competitor. Higher R&D
e¢ ciency (large enough values of  and ), induces innovation due to the large
advantage in the foreign market, which also gives M an edge in the home market.
An upward move from E1 (low ) instead by increasing  implies a shift from
zone A to B to C. (low ). Higher tari¤s protect the two rms against the foreign
entrant. Initially, increasing tari¤s stimulates the L rm, which dominates the home
market. A higher  is required for the less e¢ cient M rm to also increase R&D
after opening to PI. Alternatively, starting from E2 (high ) and moving upwards,
we experience a shift from zone A to D to C. As the M rm is relatively more
e¢ cient, it is the rst one to engage in more R&D under PI for a more protectionist
trade policy. When tari¤s rise further, L also nds it more attractive to invest a
higher amount of resources in R&D than in the absence of PI.
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4.2 Welfare implication
For future reference, consumer surplus in the home country amounts to:
CSH =
2(242   92 + 27  1822)2
2
; (50)
Finally, consumer surplus in the home country is:
CSH =






We based our paper on a stylized fact that concerns the surge of parallel import
between countries belonging to the so called South of world. The case study we had
in mind was the emergence of PI between India and Tanzania in the pharmaceutical
industry. India is more advanced in terms of technology and intellectual property
rights protection, while Tanzania could represent an interesting destination market
for Indian rms. We considered two rms located in India that di¤er in their ef-
ciency to perform a process-innovative activity. The less endowed may therefore
look for new countries to expand its nal market. However, if it decides to export,
its product can be copied and reintroduced back to the initial market.
We aimed at studying the e¤ect of PI on the R&D e¤ort undertaken by Indian
rms. To this aim, we solved the two-stage game played by these rms both in
presence and in absence of PI. We compared the optimal investment levels, showing
that PI can drive up the R&D activity level by both rms, when tari¤s on the
reintroduced product are su¢ ciently high and when rms are not too di¤erent.
Lastly, we investigated social welfare and discovered that PI is socially optimal when
both rmsinvestestment levels are higher than in absence of PI. A social planner
should therefore allow PI when this leads to higher investment e¤ort by both rms.
Trade policy in this case can be used as a complementary tool along with PI to
benet the society at large.
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